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Abstract—Stream authentication schemes (SAS) aim to achieve 
effective authentication of multicast streams over lossy networks. 
Almost all of the existing SASs are designed for stream data integrity 
protection only. In this paper, we argue that content integrity 
protection is more important than data integrity to human users. We 
present a content-aware SAS in Motion JPEG2000 streaming. In our 
scheme, a chunk of JPEG2000 codestreams is encapsulated into a 
block of packets using Multiple Description Coding (MDC). Our 
MDC exploits the inherent structure of Motion JPEG2000 
codectreams and is used to preserve the semanteme/content of the 
stream over lossy networks. To achieve robust authentication, we 
encode digital signature and other integrity tokens with Forward 
Erasure Code against packet losses. The experiment result 
demonstrates that our proposed scheme allows for effective content 
authentication of Motion JPEF2000 streaming. 
 
Index Terms—Digital Signature, Stream Authentication Scheme 
(SAS), Forward Erasure Code (FEC), Multiple Description Code 
(MDC), Motion JPEG2000. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
MEDIA streaming is becoming more and more popular due 
to the explosive growth of Internet and multimedia 
technologies and applications. Content Delivery Networks 
(CDNs) have been used to provide low latency, scalability, 
fault tolerance and load balancing for the delivery of web 
content and more recently streaming media. Figure 1 shows a 
generic architecture of CDNs, where many surrogates (e.g. 
more than 10,000 edge servers in akamai.com) are located at 
the edge of the Internet to reduce client access time. Those 
servers communicate with each other over a dedicated 
broadband network. The clients may receive the stream using 
LAN, Wireless LAN, ISDN, PSTN, and Cable Network. 
In critical application fields such as government, finance, 
healthcare and law, clients normally demand authenticity of 
the received content. Accordingly, streaming data integrity is 
of importance in these applications, thereby a security 
mechanism for authenticating stream is required.  A 
straightforward stream authentication scheme (SAS) is to 
append a signature or Message Authentic Code (MAC) to each 
packet. This naïve solution increases the communication 
overhead and degrades the performance of the sending host. 
For example, it costs 20ms in Pentium III 800MHz to generate 
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a 1024-bit RSA digital signature. Apparently, this one 
signature per packet approach is not viable for over 15fps 
video conferences (e.g. H.261 [1]). Watermark based 
authentication schemes may not help either to authenticate 
video streams because an attacker can make small 
modification on the stream without affecting the watermark 
validation. Therefore, besides necessary security function, a 
practical SAS must be lightweight in overhead and 
computational cost, and tolerant of packet losses. 
 
Fig.1. Generic architecture of a CDN 
 
To improve efficiency, existing SASs divide a stream into 
blocks of multiple packets, and generate one signature for the 
block instead of for each packet. However, this paradigm 
suffers from packet losses. Conventional approaches for 
dealing with packet loss for static data, such as packet 
retransmissions, may not be suitable for streaming and 
multicast applications. Therefore, a SAS must be robust 
against packet loss. 
This paper proposes an authentication scheme for Motion 
JPEG2000 streaming in lossy network. To our knowledge, 
there are few publications on Motion JPEG2000 streaming and 
none on secure Motion JPEG2000 streaming.   Our objective 
here is to design a SAS which is content aware (to be made 
clear in Section II) and robust over lossy networks. According 
to the specification [2], a Motion JPEG2000 file consists of 
chunks of image codestreams. In our scheme, the image 
codestreams are first transcoded into media fragments; the 
media fragments are protected with integrity tokens and  
digital signature. Then the integrity tokens and signature are 
encoded into codewords using FEC for data loss resilience; 
each media fragment  together the part of FEC codewords are 
encapsulated into a packet. This maps a chunk of codestreams 
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into a block of packets. As a result, a Motion JPEG2000 file is 
transformed into a sequence of blocks with each block 
consisting of multiple packets. When a fraction of packets in a 
block is received at the receiving end, the FEC is used to 
recover digital signature and integrity tokens which are then 
verified for content authentication. Due to the use of multiple 
description coding and sequence numbers, our scheme not 
only provides content integrity with much higher probability 
than previous SASs [6] - [17], but also defeats collage attack 
which the previous SASs suffer from. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, 
we introduce some basic concepts in Motion JPEG2000, FEC 
and MDC. We also review existing SASs and discuss their 
weaknesses. Section III elaborates the content-aware SAS. 
Section IV analyzes the performance of the proposed SAS in 
terms of computational cost and authentication probability. 
Section V describes our experiment results. Section VI draws a 
conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORK 
In the media streaming applications, the receivers may 
receive only a fraction of packets multicast from the sender in 
a lossy network. SAS targets for authenticating the received 
packets with as few payload and computational cost as 
possible. The present SAS provides an error-resilient content 
integrity protection, in particular to authentication of Motion 
JPEG2000 stream. It integrates the error-resilience approaches 
with cost amortization method together. For completeness, the 
following subsections describe the concepts of motion 
JPEG2000, error resilience technologies and previous SASs. 
A. JPEG2000 
JPEG2000 [3]-[5] is a latest international standard for still 
image compression. It allows an image to be divided into 
rectangular non-overlapping regions known as tiles, which are 
compressed independently, as though they were entirely 
distinct images. For each tile, a multiple-level Discrete 
Wavelet Transform (DWT) is performed. A rth-level DWT 
transforms subband LLr-1 into 4 subbands LLr, LHr, HLr and 
HHr, where LL0 represents the original image. Each subband is 
partitioned into code-blcoks which are the code units. In order 
to provide locality for accessing certain portions of an image, 
contiguous code-blocks forms a precinct. The bitstreams 
generated from the code-blocks are organized into a 
JPEG2000 codestream. JPEG2000 was originally designed 
with the concepts of tiling and scalability in mind so as to 
stream a JPEG2000 image efficiently. For example, 
Deshpande et al [18] proposed a scalable streaming of 
JPEG2000 image of large size according to HTTP protocol so 
that the client can obtain the selected resolution or layer image. 
B. Motion JPEG2000 
Presently, motion JPEG2000 specification [2] proposed 
streaming applications for high-quality frame-based images 
with no inter-frame coding. The applications may include PC-
based video capturing, high quality digital video recording for 
professional broadcasting and motion picture production from 
film-based to digital systems, and high-resolution medical and 
satellite imaging. However, the specification merely defines 
the file format but does not address any mechanism for 
streaming. In the specification, a motion JPEG2000 
codestream is logically divided into tracks representing timed 
sequences of media. Video tracks contain visual frames, audio 
tracks contain audio media, while hint tracks contain 
instructions for a streaming server how to form packets for a 
streaming protocol. For the sake of simplicity, the present SAS 
considers the video track only and ignores other tracks.  
C. Error Resilience 
Packet losses [19]-[22] are common on the Internet due to 
the following factors: 
♦ Routing policy: Network routers employ First-In-First-
Out policy in which, the successively arrived packets 
are dropped if the router buffer is full. 
♦ Bandwidth limitation: When a streaming is transmitted 
from a broadband network to a narrow-band network, 
for example, from LAN to PSTN, the Internet Service 
Provider has to discard a portion of arrived IP packets 
so as to customize the bandwidth. 
♦ Device limitation: The devices such as PDA, have no 
power enough to deal with all the arriving packets, and 
have to ignore a portion of them. 
♦ Delay constrain: On account of the real-time nature of 
video streaming session, packets arrived late are useless 
and discarded. 
♦ Packet error: By checking the packet checksum, the 
receiver or router may detect tampered packets and 
discard them. From the viewpoint of users, this kind of 
packets is lost. 
Retransmission-based error resilience is infeasible for 
Internet streaming because retransmission of lost data takes 
delay. Additionally, in multicast channel, the server has no 
way to retransmit the lost packets because different receivers 
may receive different subset of packets. Luckily, redundancy 
coding allows for more effective error correction, and most of 
the research on this topic falls into two categories: FEC [23] - 
[30] and MDC [31]-[32]. 
1) Forward Error Correction 
In the encoding process, media data is divided into 
fundamental segments and enhanced segments based on their 
priorities. Fundamental segments are given a higher level of 
protection because they are most important. Conversely, the 
enhanced segments are used to improve the quality of the 
media and assigned a lower level of protection. That is to say, 
a receiver can recover fundamental segments with fewer 
number of received packets than enhanced segments. 
2) Multiple Description Code 
A video (or other media) can be represented with a number 
of independent and complementary descriptions. Each 
description is typically of roughly equal importance. If either 
description is received, basic quality video is available. The 
more descriptions are used, the better video quality is. In other 
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words, each description can be decoded independently to give 
a usable video, and the video quality improves progressively 
with additional descriptions received. Generally, MDC will 
have lower compression rate than FEC. 
D. Stream Authentication Schemes 
Unlike traditional authentication of files, stream 
authentication aims for authenticating the IP packets when 
only a fraction of the sent packets arrives at the receiver end. 
Its applications include stored video streaming (e.g. movie) 
and real-time streaming (e.g. image monitoring and 
broadcasting). 
Gennaro and Rohatgi [6] initially addressed stream 
authentication and suggested two solutions to authenticate a 
stream. In their off-line paradigm, the sender divides a finite 
stream into a sequence of packets Pi (i = 1,2,…,n) and 
generates a new packet sequence P'i by appending a hash value 
of packet P'i +1 (initial value P'n+1 =0) to Pi. That is to say, P'i = 
Pi || H(P'i +1) where H(⋅) is a one way function and || denotes 
concatenation. The first packet P'0 includes H(P'1|| n) and the 
signature on H(P'1|| n) produced by the sender. After receiving 
the first packet P'0, the receiver verifies the signature, and 
saves H(P'1|| n) so as to authenticate the second packet P'1. 
After authenticating P1, the receiver extracts H(P'2) from 
packet P'1 and keeps it to authenticate P2. This process 
continues till Pn is authenticated. In their on-line solution, the 
size of the stream is unknown, each packet is appended with a 
one-time signature and a one-time public key for verifying the 
one-time signature of the next packet. The methods increase 
the traffic substantially and cannot tolerate packet loss. 
To overcome the above shortcomings, a chaining technique 
for signing flows is presented in [7] based on tree chaining 
techniques. To construct an authentication tree, a block of 
packets is considered. The root is the digest of the block and 
the intermediate node value is the digest of its children nodes, 
and the leaf is hash value of a packet. Any packet can be 
authenticated individually because it carries its own 
authentication information that consists of the block signature, 
the packet position in the tree, and the siblings of each node in 
the packet's path to the root. Wong and Lam [7] extended 
Feige-Fiat-Shamir signature scheme to be adjustable and 
incremental so that verifiers with different resources can verify 
the stream at different security levels. 
Perrig et al. [8] proposed two stream authentication 
schemes. One is Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant 
Authentication (TESLA) relying on a synchronization margin 
between the sender and the receiver. The sender transmits to 
the receiver a packet P, a commitment to a key k and MAC 
H(k || P). After a certain time interval, the sender discloses key 
k so that the receiver can verify packet P. A prerequisite 
security condition of TESLA is that the receiver must obtain a 
packet before the next packet is sent from the sender. The 
other scheme is the Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature 
(EMSS) scheme which aims to achieve non-repudiation 
besides source authentication. In the EMSS scheme, a packet 
Pi includes hash value H(Pi-1) of its previous Pi-1. The last 
packet is a signature on its previous packet (i.e., the last but 
next packet). If the signature is authenticated, all the previous 
packets are authenticated. To increase robustness, any packet 
Pi may be attached with several hash values of Pj where j<i. 
Miner and Staddon [9] authenticated digital stream over a 
lossy network based on a graph. In their authentication scheme 
tolerant of random loss, each packet is assumed to be lost 
independently with the same probability. In a p-random graph, 
for all pairs of nodes (i,j) where i<j, there is a directed edge 
from node i to node j with probability p. A node is associated 
with a packet and an edge ),( jier  means H(Pi) ∈ Pj. The first 
packet P1 is the signature packet that is always received by the 
receiver. Hence, packet Pi can be authenticated if and only if 
there is a path from Pi to P1. The authors also constructed an 
authentication scheme that is tolerant of burst loss. In this 
scheme, the packets are categorized based on their priorities. 
The packets of the highest priority class are evenly spaced 
throughout the stream. To tolerate single burst, the packets of 
the highest priority class are chained and packets of other 
classes are chained to those packets of the highest priority 
class. The authors extended this scheme to tolerate multi-burst 
loss by adding the edges ending in the highest priority packets. 
Park et al [10] constructed an authentication scheme SAIDA 
by encoding the hash values of packets and the signature on 
the whole block with an erasure code algorithm (e.g. 
Information Dispersal Algorithm). This strategy amortizes 
codewords for packet-data integrity and block signature among 
all the packets in a block to reduce space overhead and 
increase the tolerance of packet loss. Once obtaining sufficient 
number of packets, the receiver can recover the signature and 
authenticate the packets. This scheme has to balance the three 
factors: computation complexity, the recipient resource and 
authentication latency. To make the computation efficiency, 
the size of the block should be larger so as to amortize the cost 
of signature into a multiple of packets. However, the recipient 
has to wait for more packets so as to authenticate the content, 
and the buffer limitation of the recipient is another shortage. In 
error-prone network such as wireless, the payload may be 
more heavy. 
Recently, Pannetrat et al [16] improved SAIDA by 
constructing a systematic code in place of Information 
Dispersal Algorithm. Therefore only the signature codeword 
and parity of integrity codeword are piggyback into the 
packets, the received packet-data can be re-used for 
computation of the integrity message so as to reduce the 
payload per packet. 
In order to explain each received packet clearly, Wu et al 
[17] partitioned a stream object by object, so that each object 
is explained independently. This object-based solution 
alleviates the ambiguity of the stream. 
However, the above SASs share two weaknesses which will 
be addressed in the following.  
1) Content Ambiguity 
Although the above error-resilience SASs can authenticate 
the received packets with a predefined probability, they 
Y. Wu and R. H. Deng:  Content-aware Authentication of Motion JPEG2000 Stream  in Lossy Networks 795 
provide data integrity protection other than content-integrity 
protection. In other words, the semantic meaning or content of 
the received data may be different from that of the original one 
if only a fraction of authentic packets arrives at the receiver 
side successfully. For example, a JPEG2000 image shown in 
Figure 2 consists of 4 tiles Ti (i=1,2,3,4) and each tile is 
encapsulated into one IP packet, denoted as P1, P2, P3, and P4. 
The sender delivers the packets to the receivers along with the 
signature and additional integrity tokens according to the 
scheme [11]. When the stream packets are transmitted over a 
lossy network, the receiver obtains packets P1, P2, and P4 only, 
consequentially the reconstructed image is shown as Figure 3. 
 
 
Fig.2. Original image. It includes four tiles. The codestream of  each tile 
is encapsulated into one IP packet. 
 
 
 Fig.3. Reconstructed image. The third packet is lost in transit. Hence, 
one tile  can not be shown. The semantic meaning of reconstructed image 
is far from that of the original one. 
 
Is the reconstructed image trustworthy? Definitely not! In 
the above example, “authenticity” of the stream is worse than 
non-authenticity because the recipient may suspect the 
recovered image reconstructed with packets from a non-
authenticated channel, but trust the reconstructed image from 
an authenticated channel. 
2) Collage Attack 
Because most SASs authenticate streams in a block-wise 
independent fashion, they are vulnerable to collage attack [33]. 
Specifically, given two or more authenticated stream blocks, 
an adversary can forge new streams by swapping the blocks. 
For example, in Figure 4, original image 4(a) includes 4 tiles.  
 
             
             
             
             
 (a) Original image 
divided into 4 tiles 
  (b) Forged image 
with the same tiles. 
  
Fig.4. Collage attack by re-arranging the original tiles. 
 
The codestream of each tile is a block authenticated 
independently. Unfortunately, an adversary can re-organize the 
positions of the tiles so as to produce another image 4(b). Of 
course, each tile is authentic because the attacker does not 
modify the tile data. Clearly, the forged image is different from 
the original image. To defeat this counterfeiting attack, the 
signature for each block should include the stream 
identification produced via Session Description Protocol(SDP) 
[34] and block positions in the stream. 
III. PRIMINARIES  
Notation 
x || y:  The concatenation of strings x and y. 
H(⋅): a one-way function.  
Encn,k(X): Erasure encoding source X of k symbols to produce 
a codeword of n symbols.  
Decn,k(Z): Erasure decoding from codeword fragment Z of k 
symbols to recover the source of k symbols in a (n,k) 
coding system. 
Sign(m, Ps): Signing algorithm. Given a message m, only the 
signer owning private key Ps is able to generate the digital 
signature which can be verified with signer's public key. 
A. Erasure Codes 
An erasure encoding algorithm Y= Encn,k(X) takes a source 
X of k symbols and produces a codeword Y of n symbols. 
Given any codeword fragment Z of k symbols and their 
positions in the codeword Y, a decoder is able to recover 
source X with the decoding algorithm Decn,k(Z). For a good 
introduction to Reed-Solomon erasure code, please refer to 
Rizzo's work [35]. 
B. One-way Hash Function 
A one-way hash function H(m) takes a variable-length input 
string m and converts it to a fixed-length output string, called a 
hash value, or integrity token. This conversion is in one 
direction. That is to say, it is easy to compute a hash value 
H(m) from a pre-image m; however, given a value c, it is hard 
to find a pre-image m' such that c= H(m'). The widely used 
one-way hash functions are MD5[36] and SHA[37]. 
C. Message Authentication Code 
A Message Authentication Code, or MAC for short, is a 
keyed-hash function [38][39]. MAC requires that the sender 
and the receiver share a key K. Given a message m, the sender 
produces the MAC as mac= H(m || K). The receiver, who 
knows the key K, can verify the integrity of message m with 
mac. However, MAC does not provide the non-repudiation 
evidence because both the sender and the receiver can generate 
mac. 
D. Digital Signature 
A digital signature algorithm is a cryptographic tool for 
generating non-repudiation evidence, authenticating the signed 
message as well as its origin. A digital signature algorithm 
includes three modules: Kgen(⋅), Sign(⋅), and Ver(⋅). The 
Kgen(⋅) generates a pair of private/public key. The private key 
all. With the algorithm Sign(⋅) and the private key, the singer 
generates digital signatures on messages. The verifier, who 
knows the public key, can validate the signature against the 
message with Ver(⋅). Consider the RSA signature scheme 
[40][41]. The algorithm Kgen(⋅) selects N = pq, where p and q 
are two random primes. Denote  ϕ(N)=(p-1)(q-1). Then selects 
an integer 1 < e < ϕ(N) such that e is relatively prime to ϕ(N) 
and computes an integer d=e-1 mod ϕ(N). Assume signer's 
private key is (d, N) and the public key is (e, N). To sign a 
T1 T1 T2 
T3 T4 
T3 
T2 T4 
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message m, the signer computes the signature σ = Sign(m, d)= 
(H(m))d mod N. In the verification precess, Ver(m, σ, e) will 
indicate whether message m is authentic or not. Specifically, to 
verify that σ is the claimant's signature on m, a verifier first 
obtains the claimant's authentic public key (e, N), and then 
computes β = σe mod N. If β= H(m), the verifier accepts the 
signature σ on m; otherwise, he rejects the signature. Another 
commonly used signature algorithm is Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA)[42]. 
IV. CONTENT-AWARE STREAM AUTHENTICATION SCHEME 
Figure 5 illustrates the present SAS for any chunk of Motion 
JPEG2000 codestreams.  Firstly, a chunk is represented in 
multiple descriptions by interleaving the contiguous image 
codestreams and partitioning any image codestream into media 
fragments which are the units for processing. Secondly, we 
compute a hash value, called integrity token, for each media 
fragment, and compute a digital signature over all the integrity 
tokens, block identification and stream identification. Thirdly, 
the digital signature and the integrity tokens are encoded into 
codewords with FEC. Fourthly, the codeword generated from 
signature are divided into signature fragments, and the 
codeword generated from integrity tokens is divided into 
integrity fragments. Finally, a media fragment, a signature 
fragment and an integrity fragment are encapsulated into an IP 
packet. As a result, a chunk of codestreams is transformed into 
a block of IP packets. The packets in the block are delivered 
into the network sequentially.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.5.Diagram of the present stream authentication scheme. The sender 
transforms  codestreams in a chunk into packets in an authentic block., 
while the receiver authenticates each received packet 
Figure 5(a) depicts the process of generating authentic 
blocks at the sender side, and Figure 5(b) illustrates the 
process of verifying received packets of a block. In this 
verification procedure, the receiver extracts the media 
fragment mi, signature fragment si and integrity fragment ri 
from each packet Pi in the block. By employing the FEC 
decoder, the receiver reconstructs the integrity tokens and the 
signature so as to validate any received media fragment. The 
authentic media fragments will be assembled so as to recover 
frames in the nature orders. In the end, the reconstructed frame 
will be displayed one by one.  
Correspondingly, the data structure for the stream is shown 
in Figure 5. In the figure, the whole stream is divided into 
blocks. Each block consists of IP packets. Any IP packet Pi 
consists of integrity fragment ri, signature fragment si and 
media fragment mi. Additionally, several media fragments 
form a MDC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6. Data structure of a stream. If the length of the stream  is unknown 
in advance, x is ∞. 
A. Generating Multiple Descriptions 
In this content-aware SAS, any chunk of codestreams is 
represented in multiple descriptions so that a complete image 
(frame) can be shown if any description is received. To this 
end, a chunk of Motion JPEG2000 codestreams is represented 
in two layers of MDC: Interleaving the frames and amortizing 
any image codestream into several IP packets. 
1) Interleaving Frames 
A motion JPEG2000 file [2] includes a lot of chunks, and a 
chunk includes sets of codestreams of contiguous frames.  
However, when the frames are transmitted into the network, 
the receiving order may be different from the sending order 
because the UDP (User Datagram Protocol) does not provide 
reliable transmission. For example, the first frame may be  
received later than the second frame even though the former is 
sent earlier. In other words, the sending sequence of the 
packets is not important for authentication. Thus, we ignore 
the time order requirement for organizing frames in one chunk. 
Instead, we identify frame sequence based on the IP packet 
identification number or timestamp in the media data. This 
modification allows for interleaving frames in one chunk so as 
to reduce the effect of bursty packet loss on human's visual 
perception on the received stream.  
2) Amortizing Codestreams 
As mentioned in subsection II-B, the specification of 
Motion JPEG2000 permits only JPEG2000 codestream and 
each frame is encoded independently. Therefore, we can 
… … 
Stream 
Block1 Blocki Blockx 
Pj 
sj rj    mj 
P1 
s1 r1    m1 
Pn 
MDC 
… 
… 
… 
A chunk of codestream 
Generating Multiple 
Descriptions 
Generating Multiple 
Descriptions 
Producing Signature 
and integrity token 
FEC encoding 
A block of packets 
Packetizing 
(a) Preparing Authentic 
Blocks(Sender) 
Codestream in a chunk 
Assembling bitstream 
Verifying 
FEC decoding 
A block of packets 
Unpacketizing 
(b) Verifying the stream 
(Receiver) 
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process the Motion JPEG2000 stream frame by frame. 
Codestream amortization aims for minimizing the loss 
probability of content of a codestream in case of packet losses. 
The heuristic method is to load the bitstreams from different 
resolutions/layers and positions into an IP packet. For 
example, given a JPEG2000 codestream corresponding to the 
DWT coefficients shown in Figure 7, we can organize the 
bitstream in the following intuitive ways: 
♦ The bitstreams in the different subbands of the same 
resolution level should be in different IP packets. For 
example, the bitstreams for A1, A2, A3 should be in 
different IP packets. Therefore, when the packet 
encapsulated with A1 is lost, the packet encapsulated 
with A2 or A3 can show the content with low quality. 
Alternatively, the code-blocks from different subbands 
in different positions may be aggregated into one IP 
packet. For example, bitstreams from codeblocks 1, 6 
and 11 are encapsulated into one IP packets. 
♦ The bitstream corresponding to the same precinct of the 
original image should be in different IP packets. For 
example, the bitstreams for A1, B1 and C1 should be in 
different IP packets. 
Certainly, the above guidelines are not compulsory and may 
be variable in different applications. The media data in an IP 
packet is called media fragment. 
 
    
 C0  C1 
    
    
 C2  C3 
    
 
    
    
  
    
  
 
  
 
    
 
Fig. 7. Code-block and Precinct. An original image is processed with 3-
level DWT. A1, A2 and A3 forms a precinct which includes 12 code-
blocks. 
 
In all, to represent a chunk in various descriptions, the 
codestreams are divided into media fragments which are 
loaded into a number of IP packets, and a set of IP packets is 
selected for each description so that the media fragments of the 
packets represent almost the same image. For example, Table I 
lists the media fragments in packets P11 & P12, P21 & P22, and 
P31 & P32 with respect to image coefficients shown in Figure 7. 
Packets P11& P12 includes bitstreams from A1, B3 and C2; 
Packets P21 & P22 includes bitstreams from A2, B1 and C3; 
Packets P31 & P32 includes bitstreams from A3, B2 and C1. The 
bitstreams in lowest resolution (e.g., C0) will be distributed 
into each packet uniformly (not shown in Table I). Thus, the 
media fragments of packets P11 and P12 form descriptions 
MDC1; The  media fragments of packets P21 and P22 form 
descriptions MDC2; The  media fragments of P31 and P32 
belong to descriptions MDC3. 
TABLE I 
Example of MDC 
media data in 
P11 & P12 
media data in 
P21 & P22 
media data in 
P31 & P32 
A1 A2 A3 
B3 B1 B2 
C2 C3 C1 
 
B.  Producing Signature and Integrity Token 
Since a Motion JPEg2000 stream is divided into blocks 
which are constructed independently, we focus on a tth block G 
only. Figure 8 describes the process of generating the digital 
signature and the integrity tokens for block G. Assume block 
G includes n packets P1, P2, …, Pn. Each packet Pj includes 
media fragment mj which is formed in the above subsection 
IV-A.2. Specifically, the signature and integrity tokens for 
block G are generated as follows,  
♦ For media fragment mj in packet Pj, calculating hash 
value or integrity token ħ j = H(mj || j ), j=1, 2, …, n 
using a one-way hash function H(⋅). 
♦ Calculating the block hash 
HG = H(ħ 1 || ħ 2  || …|| ħ n || t || ID),  
where ID is the stream identification number which is 
negotiated in advance. 
♦  Signing the block hash HG by a digital signature 
schemeusing the sender's private key Ks, i.e., signature 
σ=Sign(HG, Ks). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.8. Generating authentication message 
C. FEC Encoding and Paketizing 
Following the process of generating the signature and 
integrity tokens, an FEC encoder is employed to encode them 
so as to tolerate packet losses. Specifically 
♦ Dividing the concatenation ħ 1 || ħ 2  || …|| ħ n into k 
symbols Hi, i=1,2,…, k. With the erasure code 
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algorithm such as Reed-Solomon code, a codeword  Cr 
= Encn,k(H1, H2, …, Hk) is produced. 
♦ Partitioning the codeword Cr into n integrity fragments 
r1, r2, …, rn equally. 
♦ Similarly, dividing signature σ into k symbols σi of the 
same size, i=1,2, …, k. (Note: σi  and Hi  may be of 
different sizes.) Then apply FEC on the signature to 
produce a signature codeword Cs = Encn,k(σ1,σ2,…, σk). 
♦ Partitioning the codeword Cs into n signature fragments 
s1, s2, …, sn equally. 
♦ Inserting integrity fragment rj and  signature fragment sj 
into IP packet Pj which has already included  the media 
fragment mj, where j=1, 2, …, n. That is to say, packet 
Pj consists of rj, sj and mj. 
D. Delivering Packets 
It is well known that lost packets in the Internet often 
happen in bursts.  Discrete Markov chain model [43][44] has 
been widely used to approximate the behavior of packet losses 
over the Internet. In the two-state mode, state 0 means that the 
network packets are transmitted successfully, and state 1 
indicates the network packets are lost. With the model, the 
discrete time step corresponds to the event of sending a packet. 
The process of the discrete Markov chain undergoing τ 
discrete time steps is equivalent to the process of sending τ 
packets through the network. Assume Pij is the transition 
probability from state i to state j.  Denote p01=α, p10=β, then 
the transition Matrix 
T = 



1110
0100
pp
pp
= 



−
−
ββ
αα
1
1
 
   = 


 −
β
α
1
1




λ0
01




− 11
αβ
(α+β)-1 
where λ=1-α-β< 1, and ι-step transition matrix is 
 
T τ= 
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Thus 
                         )(11
τp = βα
βλα τ
+
+
 (1) 
From formula (1), the larger τ is, the smaller )(11
τp  is. Thus, 
to provide highest probability of content integrity, the time 
interval between sending two packets representing the same 
content should be as big as possible. That is to say, a block 
should be organized MDC by MDC such that the average time 
interval between sending packets for the same content is 
sufficiently large. For example, a JPEG2000 image sequence 
is represented as Figure 9 so that each content has almost the 
same receiving probability. After organizing the IP packets as 
the structure shown in Figure 9, the IP packet can be delivered 
sequentially. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 MDC1 MDC3 B
yt
es
  P
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iti
on
 
    
 
MDC2 
   
 
 
Fig.9. Block structure. The block includes n IP packets which are 
assigned into three MDCs. Each packet includes fragments from 
signature codeword, integrity message and meda data. 
 
E. Verifying IP Packets 
With respect to Figure 10, the verification process roughly 
reverses the generation process for an authentic block. Based 
on the FEC coding, at least k packets of a block should be 
received so as to recover the signature and integrity tokens. 
Without loss of generality, suppose the first k packets P1, P2, 
…, Pk are obtained successfully. Thus, the receiver retrieves 
the integrity fragments r1, r2, …, rk from the received packets 
so as to recover the codeword Cr with decoding algorithm 
Decn,k(r1,r2,…, rk). That is to say, the hash value gi (i=1, 2, …, 
n) for the media fragment mi is obtained.  The reconstructed 
hash for the tth block is  
hG = H(g1 || g2  || …|| gn || t || ID). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.10. Verifying Packets.  Without loss of generality, suppose the first k 
packets are received, the verifier checks the authenticity of received 
packets. If a tampered packet is used for reconstructing the signature, 
the verification process should be repeated.  
 
Meanwhile, signature fragments s1, s2, …, sk are retrieved too. 
With the decoder Decn,k(s1, s2, …, sk), the signature σ for the 
block is reconstructed. Therefore, the signature is able to be 
verified against hG with algorithm Ver(hG, σ, e), where e is the 
authentic public key of the signer. If not match, the whole 
block is bogus and discarded. Otherwise, the receiver will 
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check any media fragment mi against the integrity token gi. 
The tampered packets are discarded. Furthermore, if the 
tampered packet is used for reconstructing the signature, the 
verification process is repeated with a new set of packets. 
V. PERFORMANCE 
In this section, we investigate the performance of the present 
SAS in the computation cost at the sender side and receiver 
side. Next, we study the authentication probability because it is 
another important concern in the stream authentication. 
Finally, we suggest how to transcode the Motion JPEG2000 
stream in a narrowband network so that the devices with 
limited resource such as PDA can receive the Motion 
JPEG2000 stream. 
A. Computational Cost 
Besides the necessary computational cost of Motion 
JPEG2000 coding, the computational cost at the sender side is 
to generate the authentication message. The operation includes 
generation of one signature and two codewords for each block. 
Although the signature generation is time-consuming, its 
computational cost is amortized into many IP packets or 
frames. Hence the computational budget for each packet or 
frame is small. The computational cost at the receiver end is 
much smaller because the system parameters may be selected 
for efficient verification. For example, a properly selected 
verification key in RSA signature scheme enables the verifying 
time is less than 1% of signing time. The other computation 
such as decoding the codewords is lightweight. Thus the 
proposed solution is efficient in computational cost. 
B. Authentication Probability 
In the Markov model, suppose stationary probabilities of 
lost packet and received packet are  π0  and π1 respectively. 
LEMMA 1:  Assume the expected burst length to be γ in a 
lossy network,  then four transition probabilities can be 
expressed  as follows: 
p00 = 1- π1 /(γπ0) ,  p01 = π1 /(γπ0) 
    p10 = γ-1,      p11 = 1-γ-1 
PROOF. see [11]. 
To evaluate the authentication probability, we take 
consideration of the experiment results from Table II in [43], 
where α = p01 =0.0192, β = p10 =0.8454. Then the expected 
burst-loss length γ = 1.1829, and stationary no-loss probability 
π0= 0.9778, and stationary loss probability π1 = 0.0222. 
Let the number of lost packets as L(n) in a  block including 
n packets. Then the number of expected lost packets is 
E[L(n)] = π1 n = 0.0222n. 
To authenticate the received packets, X ≤ n-k in an encoder 
Encn,k(⋅) FEC, where X is the number of lost packets, i.e. 
P(X ≤ n-k) = iin
kn
i i
n
10
0
ππ −
−
=
∑ 



 = iin
kn
i i
n
0222.09778.0
0
−
−
=
∑ 



 
For example, when there are 200 IP packets in a block 
(solid line in Figure 11), Enc100,93(⋅) Reed-Solomon code 
should be employed with authentication probability is about 
92%. Usually, for a fix k, the smaller n in Encn,k(⋅) is, the 
higher the authentication probability is, but the more the 
payload in each packet is. 
C. Capability of Transcoding Stream 
In the content delivery, a stream is usually transcoded so as 
to meet the requirements of network bandwidth and receiver 
resources [45]. In JPEG2000 specification, an image is 
segmented into tiles, then each tile is encoded independently 
using SNR or spatially scalable techniques. Additionally, the 
motion JPEG2000 stream generated from the present SAS is 
represented in MDCs. Consequentially, it is trivial to transcode 
the stream. What a transcoder (e.g. proxy) needs to do is to 
discard the codestreams of the unimportant frames, MDCs, 
resolutions, or layers so as to meet the requirements of 
network/clients. Unfortunately, the content may be no longer 
authentic if too many packets are discarded. 
Fig. 11. Authentication probability vs. number of parity packets. 
VI. EXPERIMENT 
Continuing the example shown in Figure 2 where the 
original image is segmented into 4 tiles and each tile 
codestream is encapsulated into one IP packet. The stream 
includes only one block which consists of four packets.  In the 
following, the signer produces an authentic block and sends 
the packets of the block into the network. The receiver verifies 
the packets in case of packet loss. This experiment targets for 
demonstrating the content authentication in the packet loss 
networks. 
A. Generating Authentic Block 
A 3-level Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is applied to 
each tile Ti in Figure 2,  i=1,2,3,4. For simplicity, we describe 
the DWT coefficients directly instead of the JPEG2000 
bitstream. Denote the DWT coefficients for the subbands LL3, 
LH3, HL3, HH3 to be li, and the rest coefficients to be hi, for 
any tile i=1,2,3,4. To generate an authentic block, we improve 
the algorithm proposed in [11] such that the system is resilient 
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to collage attack. Specifically, to generate the authentic block 
at the sender side, the signer should process as follows. 
♦ Calculate the integrity tokens 
ħ 1=H(l1|| h3|| 1 || 3)  (2) 
ħ 2=H(l2 || h4|| 2 || 4) (3) 
ħ 3=H(l3|| h1|| 3 || 1) (4) 
ħ 4=H(l4|| h2|| 4 || 2) (5) 
In the above equation H(x|| y || u || v), x and y forms a 
media fragment while u and v represent their locations. 
Divide (ħ 1 || ħ 2 || ħ 3 || ħ 4) into 3 symbols equally, 
denoted as b1, b2, b3. 
♦ Calculate the integrity fragments 
(r1, r2, r3, r4) = Enc4,3( b1, b2, b3). 
Where r1, r2, r3, and r4 are of the same length. Here, we 
utilize Reed-Solomon algorithm Enc4,3 code so as to 
tolerate one packet loss within this block. 
♦ Compute the block hash 
hG = H ħ 1 || ħ 2 || ħ 3 || ħ 4 || ID) (6) 
where ID is the well-known identification of the 
streaming, the block identification is omitted since there 
is only one block in the exemplary stream. 
♦ Sign on hG with signer's private key d so as to provide a 
signature σ=Sign(hG, d). Evenly divide σ into 3 
segments σ1, σ2, σ3. 
♦ Calculate signature fragments 
(s1, s2, s3, s4) = Enc4,3(σ1, σ2, σ3),  
where s1, s2, s3, and s4 are of same length. Then form the 
packets as Figure 12. From Figure12, we know that there 
are two MDCs. MDC1 includes l1, h3, l2 and h4, MDC2 
includes l3, h1, l4 and h2. Either MDC1 or MDC2 can 
represent the whole image because anyone has the 
bitstreams from all tiles. Thus, the image content is 
complete if only one packet is lost. 
 
r1  r2  r3  r4 
s1  s2  s3  s4 
h3  h4  h1  h2 
l1  l2  l3  l4 
P1  P2  P3  P4 
 
Fig.12. Block including four IP packets. P1 and P2 forms one MDC, and 
P3 and P4 forms another MDC. Each packet include bitstreams of low 
subbands of one tile  and bitstream of high subbands of another tile, as 
well as signature fragment and integrity segment. 
B. Verifying the Packets 
After the block in the Figure 12 is multicast packet by 
packet, a receiver may obtain packets P1, P2 and P4 only, but 
miss packet P3. Thanks for the FEC coding, the receiver can 
check the authenticity of the received packets. The verification 
process is as follows. 
♦ Based on the Reed-Solomon coding algorithm, b1, b2, 
and b3 can be recovered from r1, r2, and r4, i.e., ħ 1, 
ħ 2, ħ 3, ħ 4 are available. hG is deduced easily 
following equation (6). 
♦ Similarly, the receiver also recovers σ1, σ2, and σ3. 
That is to say, the signature σ is available. 
♦ With the public key of the signer, the receiver checks 
whether the signature σ matches hG. If not, the receiver 
will reject all the P1, P2 and P4. Otherwise, the receiver 
will check them based on equations (2), (3), and (5). 
♦ For those authentic packets, the receiver will re-
assemble the DWT coefficients in the nature order. For 
those lost bitstream e.g. h1 and l3 due to packet losses, 
the media fragment data are set to 0 and image 
enhancement technologies may be applied to increase 
the image quality. 
The recovered image is shown in Figure 13 if there is no 
tampering except one packet loss. From the recovered image, 
we observe that the tiles for “Nasdaq” and “2pts,at” are 
intelligible although their qualities are low.  That is to say, the 
content of the image is reserved even though the quality is 
reduced. 
 
Fig. 13. Recovered image with authentic packets. The lost packet P3 
consists of the subband data of high resolution of tile T1 and the subband 
data of low resolution of tile T3. Hence, the qualities of both tiles are 
degraded but recognizable 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although stream authentication attracts a lot of researchers, 
it is still open for a widely acceptable solution. This paper 
points out that the previous SASs [6]-[17] are vulnerable to 
collage attack, and ignorant of content integrity in a lossy 
network. To defense against collage attack, our scheme 
incorporates the unique stream identification, block 
identification and packet sequences into the generation process 
of the signature and integrity tokens. The signature and 
integrity tokens are amortized into all the packets using the 
Forward Erasure Code so as to tolerate packet losses. We also 
represent a chunk of codestreams in multiple descriptions by 
exploiting the property of Motion JPEG2000 codestream. The 
Multiple descriptions not only increase the resilience of packet 
loss, but also reduce content ambiguity. The present scheme 
can be extended to other stream format such as MPEG4. 
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